Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 7
Issue 2 Spring 1974

Article 8

1974

Recent Decisions
Patricia D. Owen
Jeffery R. Rush
Frank R. Krok
Paul P. Sanford
Edward N. Perry

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Admiralty Commons, International Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Patricia D. Owen, Jeffery R. Rush, Frank R. Krok, Paul P. Sanford, Edward N. Perry, and Edward A.
Betancourt, Recent Decisions, 7 Vanderbilt Law Review 480 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol7/iss2/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Recent Decisions
Authors
Patricia D. Owen, Jeffery R. Rush, Frank R. Krok, Paul P. Sanford, Edward N. Perry, and Edward A.
Betancourt

This symposium is available in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/
vol7/iss2/8

RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RECEIPT OF BENEFITS
UNDER STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT CONTAINING EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION DOES NOT BAR SUBSEQUENT ACTION AGAINST
EMPLOYER FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS

Plaintiff, a longshoreman, was injured while working aboard defendant's vessel in the navigable waters of Alaska. After collecting
state workmen's compensation benefits,' plaintiff brought an action 2 against his employer-shipowner, alleging negligence3 and that
the vessel was unseaworthy.' Defendant's motion for summary
judgment in the trial court was sustained on the ground that
Alaska's workmen's compensation statute provides an exclusive
remedy 5 that precludes further recovery from an employer. On
1. Plaintiff received $1606.84 in workmen's compensation benefits.
2. Plaintiff brought this maritime action in a state court, relying on the "saving to suitors" clause, which permits state courts to entertain in personam actions
in admiralty. Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). See generally G.
GILMORE

& C.

BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §

1013, at 33 (1957).

3. Plaintiff's complaint also contained an allegation of negligence, but on
appeal plaintiff acknowledged that the trial court properly dismissed the count
for negligence, conceding that because negligence is not a peculiarly maritime tort
his right of recovery for negligence was merged in the workmen's compensation
judgment.
4. The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel for seamen, first announced in The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), has been expanded considerably. Today the doctrine
of seaworthiness imposes on a shipowner a nondelegable absolute liability, neither
predicated on negligence nor satisfied by the exercise of due diligence, which
extends to the vessel, her crew and her gear. "If a defective condition of the ship
proximately causes the individual's injury the ship is unseaworthy as to him no
matter how sound or staunch she may be in every other respect." 2 M. NoRRIS,
THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 612, at 167 (3d ed. 1970). See generally G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 2, § 6, at 38-44; Kolmeyer, The Warranty of Seaworthiness:
To Whom Is It Owed?, 7 CALIF. WESTERN L. REv. 109 (1970).
5. ALAS. STAT. § 23.30.055 (1972) provides in part: "Exclusiveness of liability.
The liability of an employer prescribed in § 45 of this chapter [employer's liability for workmen's compensation] is exclusive and in place of all other liability of
the employer and any fellow employee to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages from the employer or fellow employees at law or in admiralty
on account of the injury or death. . ....
6. Most state workmen's compensation acts contain an exclusive remedy proSpring, 1974
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appeal to the Supreme Court of Alaska, held, reversed. Receipt of
benefits under a state workmen's compensation statute containing
an exclusive remedy provision does not bar a subsequent action
against the employer for unseaworthiness. Barberv. New England
Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alas. 1973).
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,7 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a state workmen's compensation award to a
stevedore because his injury occurred on navigable waters. The
Court ruled that state workmen's compensation benefits stop at
the water's edge: injuries that occurred on shore were within the
reach of state compensation acts while injuries arising on navigable waters were within the exclusive domain of federal admiralty
jurisdiction. Harsh results were inevitable in the absence of a federal compensation act. 8 Within the next decade the Court twice
invalidated congressional efforts to legitimize the application of
state statutes to maritime injuries as unconstitutional encroachments on federal admiralty jurisdiction.' In Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde,"° the Court tempered the rigid exclusivity of the
Jensen rule by announcing the "local concern" doctrine." Under
this doctrine state compensation acts governed maritime injuries
if the injured party was engaged in matters of "local concern" and
the use of the local remedy would not "materially prejudice" the
general maritime law. Thus in Grant Smith the Court held that
vision. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601 (West 1971); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP.
LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306, § 3 (1967).
7. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
8. See Smith, On the Waterfront at the Pier'sEdge: The Longshoremen'sand
Harbor Workers' CompensationAct, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 114, 116 (1970).
9. E.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 235 U.S. 144 (1920). In Washington
v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, stated: "Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the
maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment.
This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability
law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be
delegated to the several States." 264 U.S. at 227.
10. 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
11. "[T]he purpose of the local concern doctrine was entirely one of enlarging, not diminishing, the range of remedies available to waterfront workers. In the
absence of a valid compensation act for waterfront workers injured on navigable
waters before 1927, the courts did the best they could to soften the absoluteness
of the doctrine of maritime uniformity by carving out the local concern exception." Larson, ConflictsBetween Seamen's Remedies and Workmen's Compensation Acts, 40 FORD. L. REv. 473, 510 (1972).
Vol. 7-No. 2
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the state act's "exclusive remedy" provision superseded a carpenter's right to recover against his employer in admiralty for injuries
sustained on navigable waters because the employment contract
was nonmaritime and the workman's activities bore no direct relation to commerce or navigation. Similarly, in Millers' Indemnity
Underwritersv. Braud, 2 the Court held that recovery under Texas'
compensation act supplanted a diver's right to sue under general
maritime law.1 3 Although the local concern doctrine restored state
compensation acts to some waterfront activities, many longshoremen and harbor workers still had no statutory remedy for occupational injuries that occurred aboard ship." In 1927, Congress attempted to fill this gap by enacting the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 0 which created a federal remedy for injuries arising on navigable waters, provided
claimant was not covered by state law under the local concern
doctrine. Initially, therefore, federal and state remedies were mutually exclusive. This jurisdictional scheme was modified considerably, however, when the Supreme Court adopted a "twilight zone"
conceptualization of federal jurisdiction in admiralty within which
state jurisdiction existed alongside federal jurisdiction.I The "twilight zone" was not spatially delimited; rather, it created a rebuttable presumption that allowed plaintiff to maintain his action regardless of the statutory source of plaintiff's remedy. 7 Then, in
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.,'1 the Supreme Court expressly recog12.
13.

270 U.S. 59 (1926).
Plaintiff sought to recover against her deceased husband's employer in

general federal maritime law. The employer argued that plaintiff could not maintain a maritime action because benefits had been recovered under the Texas
Workmen's Compensation Act, which provided the exclusive remedy against an
employer. The Supreme Court accepted defendant's argument on the grounds
that decedent wes engaged in a matter of local concern and that state regulation
of this activity would not prejudice materially the general maritime law. 270 U.S.
at 64.
14. See Smith, supra note 8.
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1970).
16. In Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942), the Court defined
the "twilight zone" as "that shadowy area withinivhich, at some undefined and
undefineable point, state laws can validly provide compensation." 317 U.S. at
253.
17. Practically speaking, plaintiffs had a choice of remedies, since they were
generally permitted to maintain actions under whichever statute they sought
recovery.
18. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
Spring, 1974
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nized the concurrent jurisdiction of LHWCA and state compensation acts over injuries sustained on navigable waters. Engrafted
onto the history of statutory compensation schemes for maritime
injuries is the post-World War II rise of the doctrine of unseaworthiness.11 In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,2 1 the Supreme Court
first held that a shipowner's duty of seaworthiness extends to any
longshoreman injured aboard ship while performing ship's work.
And in 1963, in Reed v. The Yaka2 the Court went further and held
22
that despite the LHWCA's explicit exclusive remedy provision,
a longshoreman eligible for benefits under the Act is not barred
from suing his employer for breach of the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The rise of the doctrine of unseaworthiness also resurrected the jurisdictional questions that the Court had attempted
to resolve in Calbeck. Thus in Pope & Talbot v. Hawn,2 the Court
noted that an action sounding in unseaworthiness states a substantial claim exclusively controlled by federal maritime law that cannot be abrogated by state law.2 4 The extent to which this maritime
tort concept is available to longshoremen was established recently
in Victory CarriersInc. v. Law,2 in which the Supreme Court held
that state law, rather than the maritime duty of seaworthiness,
protected a longshoreman whose injury arose on land while using
a stevedore's forklift to load defendant's vessel. Under federal law,
therefore, the water's edge is once more pre-eminent. Whether
recovery under a state's exclusive remedy statute can preclude a
subsequent suit for unseaworthiness, however, had not been decided until the decision in the instant case.
In the instant case, the court recognized that plaintiff's claim for
19. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 2, at 248-394; Tetreault,
Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of HarborWorkers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381
(1954).
20. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
21. 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970): "The liability of an employer prescribed in
[section 4] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer
to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents,
next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer
at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death ...

23. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
24. "[W]hile states may sometimes supplement federal maritime policies,
states may not deprive a person of any substantial maritime rights." 346 U.S. at
409-10.
25. 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
Vol. 7-No. 2
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unseaworthiness invoked federal maritime principles that controlled the case. 6 Noting the paucity of recent authority on the
question before it, the court explained that Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde,2 7 which involved an exclusive remedy provision
of a state compensation act, was distinguished by the criteria that
brought it under the "local concern" doctrine, which was controlling when that case was decided in 1922.28 The case of Millers'
Underwritersv. Braud2 also was limited to its facts and the state
of general maritime law existing in 1926. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that Grant Smith and Millers', although factually distinguishable from the instant case, 3 stand for the proposition that
state limitation of federal maritime rights in some instances does
not violate the supremacy clause. 3 ' The court then documented a
recent trend in case law reflecting a diminution of state jurisdiction in admiralty,3 2 but concluded that the judiciary's role is to
26. The court briefly examined the duty of a state court to apply federal
maritime law in admiralty cases brought under the "saving to suitors" clause. 510
P.2d at 808. See note 2 supra.
27. 257 U.S. 469 (1922). See notes 10 and 11 supra and accompanying test.
28. In Grant Smith, the Supreme Court found that the employee's contract
was nonmaritime and that his work had no direct relation to navigation or commerce. 510 P.2d at 809.
29. 270 U.S. 59 (1926). See notes 12 and 13 supra and accompanying text.
30. The court pointed out that the work of a longshoreman has a recognized
direct relation to commerce, citing Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Cook,
281 U.S. 233 (1930). 510 P.2d at 812.
31. 510 P.2d at 809. The court also rejected the persuasiveness of Alcoa
Steamship Co. v. Rodriquez, 376 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905
(1967), which held that a longshoreman's recovery under the Puerto Rico workmen's compensation act barred subsequent suit for unseaworthiness. The court
pointed to the unique position of Puerto Rico in American admiralty created, in
part, by § 8 of the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 749 (1970), which authorized the Puerto
Rican legislature to supplant all federal maritime law with local law, except where
Congress has expressly stated otherwise.
32. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (plaintiff, whose
husband died on Florida's territorial waters, could maintain a wrongful death
action in general federal maritime law despite Florida's refusal to recognize unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery under its wrongful death statute); Kossick
v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (Ohio's statute of frauds on verbal
agreements inapplicable in steward's action for maintenance and cure); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) (New York's
common law distinction between licensee and invitee inapplicable in an admiralty action for negligence); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221
(1958) (Texas' statute of limitations inapplicable to an action for unseaworthiness
combined with an action for negligence under the Jones Act).
Spring, 1974
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accommodate federal and local interests in areas in which concerns
of both overlap. 33 To effect this accommodation, the court in the
instant case adopted the test of whether barring plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim because of his recovery under the state workmen's compensation act would "materially prejudice the characteristic features of the federal law and interfere with the uniformity
of that law,

'34

by making the availability of an unseaworthiness

claim depend on a plaintiff's nonacceptance of a state remedy or
whether the federal system could accommodate the prohibition of
the unseaworthiness claim. Relying on the history of the exclusive
remedy provision of LHWCA, the court concluded that material
prejudice would result if the state exclusive remedy provision were
allowed to control. Had plaintiff recovered benefits under
LHWCA, his subsequent action for unseaworthiness would be allowed. The court reasoned by analogy that plaintiffs recovery
under a state statute should not produce a different result. Moreover, since the federal judiciary refused to allow LHWCA's exclusive remedy provision to preclude an action for unseaworthiness,
by implication, a state court's failure to follow this precedent
would materially prejudice maritime law.
The instant case is the first to hold that state workmen's compensation benefits merely supplement 5 a longshoreman's right to
recover against his employer for unseaworthiness. To reach this
conclusion the court was required not only to strike down the exclusive remedy provision of the state act but also to limit two
ostensibly controlling Supreme Court decisions to their particular
facts and historical significance. In reaching its decision, the court
was sensitive to the functional interplay between the rise of the
exclusively federal remedy based on unseaworthiness and the judiciary's ever-changing posture on state jurisdiction over maritime
activities. Since neither Grant Smith nor Millers' have been expressly overruled, the court easily could have invoked stare decisis
to thwart plaintiffs attempt to recover in unseaworthiness after he
had availed himself of state compensation benefits. The court recognized, however, that a contemporary application of GrantSmith
33. 510 P.2d at 811.
34. 510 P.2d at 811.
35. The court explained that the amount plaintiff received under the state act
would be credited to his employer's obligation should plaintiff succeed in obtaining a judgment against his employer for unseaworthiness. 510 P.2d at 813 n.39.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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or Millers'requiresan accommodation of the liberal maritime remedy of unseaworthiness. Consequently, the court very adroitly
adopted the test established in Grant Smith, i.e. whether application of local law would materially prejudice the uniformity of the
general maritime law and emerged with the desired result. The
decision is salutary for at least two reasons. First, it reflects the
expanding movement in American admiralty to extend uniformly
the concept of liability based on the duty of seaworthiness to longshoremen injured while working aboard ship. The decision prevents longshoremen in Alaska from forfeiting a demonstrably valuable maritime right merely by accepting comparatively nominal
benefits under state law. Secondly, the court's methodology is
commendably straight-forward. Rather than relying on a simplistic Jensen-type argument to oust state jurisdiction, 6 the court judiciously adopted the Grant Smith doctine of "material prejudice." Having established these guidelines, the court correctly analogized to the Supreme Court's dismantling of LHWCA's exclusive remedy provision, thereby permitting longshoremen to seek
recovery for unseaworthiness. Thus the court engaged in a process
of state-federal accommodation, rather than decision by mechanical formula.3 7 The material prejudice test is both more administratively durable and jurisprudentially honest.
PatriciaD. Owen

36. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
37. In Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), the Supreme Court
held that an action for unseaworthiness is based on a "maritime tort, a type of
action which the Constitution has placed under national power to control ....
346 U.S. at 409; see note 24 supra.
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COMMON MARKET- COUNCIL
TAKE

PRECEDENCE

OVER

REGULATIONS-REGULATIONS

PROVISIONS

OF

MEMBER

STATES'

CONSTITUTIONS

A request for a preliminary interpretation of Council Regulations 1975/69 and 2195/691 was submitted to the Court of Justice
of the European Communities by the local court of tonato, Italy
as a result of a suit pending in that court between Orsolina Leonesio, an Italian farmer, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
of the Republic of Italy relating to the premiums granted by those
Regulations to farmers for slaughtering their dairy cows. Relying
on the announcement by the Italian authorities that the subsidy
would be paid subject to the adoption of the statutory provisions
approving the necessary funds by the Italian Parliament, Signora
Leonesio had slaughtered five cows in 1970 and received a conditional authorization for payment. In November 1971, Signora Leonesio sued for her subsidy in the local Italian court. The Italian
authorities contended that the Regulations had no direct effect in
Italy and did not grant a right to payment until the Parliament
had appropriated the necessary funds as required by the Italian
Constitution.2 Signora Leonesio claimed that the Regulations were
legally complete and directly applicable in Italy according to article 189 of the European Economic Community Treaty3 and that
article 10 of Regulation 1975/69 prohibits nations from attaching
additional conditions to premiums without the Commission's consent. She argued further that a member state cannot subject a
1. Because of growing surpluses in the milk and dairy products sector of the
European Economic Community (EEC), the Council of Ministers set up a system
of premiums to induce farmers to reduce their stock of milk cows by slaughtering.
Regulation 1975/69 established the premium system. Article 10 of this Regulation
allows member states to set up additional conditions to payment of the premiums
if certain procedures, which included EEC approval, were followed. Implementing provisions for Regulation 1975/69 were contained in Regulation 2195/69. Article 10 of Regulation 2195/69 states that the payment must be made within two
months after proof of slaughtering. Leonesio v. Italian Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
8175, at 8339, 8344-45 (1972).
2. Article 81 of the Italian Constitution states that every law resulting in
public expenditures must indicate the source of the necessary funds.
3. Article 189 provides: "Regulations shall have general application. They
shall be binding in every respect and directly applicable in each Member State."
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 189,
298 U.N.T.S. 3, in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
4901 (1973) (authentic English
text) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
Vol. 7-No. 2
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financial obligation under Community law to national constitutional appropriation requirements since to do so would create the
possibility of discrimination between nationals of member states,
thereby endangering the very existence of the EEC. The Italian
court referred two questions to the Court of Justice: (1) were the
Regulations directly applicable and, if so, did they create individual rights for the nationals of member states; and (2) if the answer
to the first question is affirmative, was the claim subject to national constitutional requirements on the time of payment, assuming all conditions imposed on the owner of the cattle are met. In
the Court of Justice, held, Community regulations produce direct
effects in member states subject only to those conditions required
by the regulations themselves; they also create individual rights for
nationals that cannot be compromised by constitutional budgetary
requirements of the member states. Leonesio v. Italian Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8175 (1972).
Relying on articles 54 and 1895 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of
Justice has taken the position that regulations produce a direct
effect in member states by creating rights in the nationals of the
member states which the national courts have an obligation to
protect. This position has produced a great deal of litigation questioning the status of regulations and other Community acts in a
member state's legal system.' The Court of Justice developed the
concept of the supremacy of Community law over subsequent national law in a series of cases, and various theories have been cited
4. Article 5 provides: "Member States shall take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure their obligations arising out of this Treaty
as resulting from actions taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty."
EEC Treaty, art. 5, 1 CCH CoiM. MKT. REP.
181.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. A conflict between a regulation and a rule of national law of an earlier date
has caused no problems because all EEC countries recognize the principle of lex
posteriorderogatlegi priori(a later statute removes the effect of a prior conflicting
one). Problems arising from a conflict between a regulation and a national law of
a later date, however, are affected by the manner in which member states view
the relationship between international and national law. The most serious challenges to the supremacy of Community law have come from states, such as Germany and Italy, that adhere closely to the dualist theory of international law. R.
LAuWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE OF ComMuNITY DECISIONS 14-27 (1973).

Spring, 1974
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in support of the concept.7 In Costa v. E.N.E.L.,8 the Court based
its holding that a Community regulation takes precedence over
later national laws on the theory that by accepting the EEC Treaty
the member states created a new binding legal order to which they
transferred certain powers, thus limiting their sovereignty in certain specified areas. The Court also emphasized the reciprocity9
argument and the need for uniformity' to safeguard Community
aims. Later cases, such as Politi," which declared that article 189
bars the application of all prior or subsequent legal actions that
cannot be reconciled with the regulations' provisions, and Salgoil,'2
which held that the Treaty provisions that impose a duty to act
and grant no discretion to the local government are directly applicable to member states, have refined these approaches.' 3 In addition, the Court of Justice and the courts of the member states
recently have been faced with the ultimate supremacy question,
i.e. the conflict between Community law and a national rule of law
of constitutional rank. Belgium," Luxembourg 5 and the Nether7. The Court of Justice and the leading commentators on the legal structure
of the EEC have cited various reasons for the supremacy of EEC law without
labeling any particular theory as decisive: (1) new binding legal order; (2) limitation of competence; (3) transfer of power; (4) reciprocity; (5) principle of uniformity, safeguarding community goals; and (6) specific original nature. See A. PARRY
& S. HARDY, EEC LAW 132-51 (1973).
8. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8023 (1964).
9. "This incorporation into the law of each members country of provisions of
Community origin, and the letter and spirit of the Treaty in general, have as a
corollary the impossibility for the states to assert as against a legal order accepted
by them on a reciprocal basis a subsequent unilateral measure which could not
be challenged by it." 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8023, at 7390.
10. "The preeminence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189, under
which regulations are 'binding' and 'directly applicable in each member state.'
This provision, which contains no reservation, would be meaningless if a Member
State could unilaterally nullify its effects through a legislative act that could be
asserted as against the Community texts." 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8023, at
7390-91.
11. Politi v. Italian Ministry of Finance, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8159
(1971).
12. Salgoil v. Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8072
(1972).
13. See also Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellant, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8056 (1969) (conflicts between the Community rule and national rules on competition should be resolved in favor of the supremacy of Community rules).
14. See Minister for Economic Affairs v. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse "Le Ski,"
Vol. 7-No. 2
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lands'" appear to be willing to accept the supremacy of Community
law. The position of French courts remains unclear because there
has been no definitive statement made by the courts and the
French constitution is subject to various interpretations on the
matter." The strongest statement is found in the Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft,'8 a German case in which the Court of Justice
concluded that a Community regulation could not be challenged
on the basis that it affected basic constitutional rights or principles
protected by a member state because to allow such a challenge
would impair the unity and effectiveness of Community law. In
response to this ruling, the German court'9 maintained that since
the EEC has no written constitution, fundamental national rights
protected by a state's constitution must continue to be observed
and referred the case to the German Constitutional Court, which
has yet to reach a decision. The Italian Constitutional Court apparently has retreated from its position in the Costa v. E.N.E.L.0
case, i.e. that the EEC Treaty had only the status of ordinary law
and thus could not prevail over later national law. In the San
Michele2' case, the Court declared that the European Coal and
Steel Community Treaty, 22 the forerunner of the EEC Treaty, created a new separate legal order, and that the Treaty's provisions
thus were not subject to the Italian Constitution. The breadth of
9 Comm. MKT. L. REV. 229 (1972) (Community law takes precedence over later
national law).
15. See Chambre de Metiers v. Pagani, Pas. Lux. XVI 150 (1954), discussed
in A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 7, at 155 (internatonal treaties take precedence over national legislation).
16. The Netherlands constitution was revised in 1956 in anticipation of the
development of Community law. It provides that the constitutionality of a treaty
may not be challenged and that a treaty may preempt certain constitutional
provisions as well as prior or subsequent national laws. Constitution, arts. 60(3),
63, 66 (1953, amended 1956) (Netherlands).
17. See R. LAUWAARS, supra note 6, at 15-17.
18. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
8126 (1970).
19. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 9 Comm.MKT. L. REV. 177 (1972).
20. Costa v. E.N.E.L., 3 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 425 (1964).
21. Societa Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority, 6 COMM.MKT. L. REV.
160 (1967).
22. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, in W.
FRIEDMANN, ANTI-TRUST LAW 579 (1956).
Spring, 1974
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this decision is unclear because the Court stated that certain constitutional rights still could be considered supreme. In addition,
in
other court decisions and the Italian Government's position
3
settled.1
from
far
is
question
this
that
indicate
cases
later
In the instant case, the Court first examined article 189 of the
Treaty and reaffirmed its earlier rulings that the direct applicability of regulations produces immediate effects in each member state
and grants individual rights that the national courts must protect.
The Court noted, however, that the legal effect of a regulation
depends somewhat on whether the regulation leaves some discretion to the national authorities in its implementation. The Court
then examined Regulations 1975/69 and 2195/69 and found that
they left little discretion to the national government and that this
discretion had been exercised by establishing the premium system
in Italy. Therefore, since Signora Leonesio had met all the requirements, her right to payment was absolute. This conclusion was
reinforced by the failure of Italy to utilize the procedure expressly
provided by Regulation 2195/69 whereby the individual state could
impose additional conditions on payment and also by the specific
recital that it was necessary for all payments to be made within
two months after proof of slaughtering. 2 The Court rejected the
constitutional defense by citing article 5 of the Treaty and the
reasoning of the Salgoil and Politicases for the proposition that the
Italian claim would discriminate against Italian farmers and
thereby destroy Common Market economic policy which relies on
the uniform application of all regulations within the member countries.
In this decision, the Court of Justice forcefully reaffirmed its
position that EEC regulations take precedence over the constitutional law of the member states. Examined by itself, the narrow
holding of the case relating to constitutional budgetary requirements is reasonable and essential for the effective functioning of
the EEC. The Italian Government clearly cannot be given the
equivalent of a veto power over EEC activities by what could be
termed an administrative requirement of its constitution. One
23. For an analysis of recent conflicting Italian court decisions, see Bebr,
Community Regulations and National Law, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 87, 88-96
(1973).
24. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8175, at 8342, 8347.
25. See note 1 supra.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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must take note, however, of the Court's reasoning relating to the
doctrine of the absolute supremacy of Community law, which was
dealt with more explicitly in InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft.21
These two decisions are the culmination of the trend developed in
the Costa, Salgoil and Politi cases, which held that various regulations and treaty provisions take precedence over subsequent national law of a rank lower than constitutional.2 7 They also, however, represent a quantum leap in the Court's reasoning that is
certain to provoke continued controversy within the Common Market.2 This expected controversy is the result of the method of
adoption of the EEC Treaty in the member states" and the fact
that just as the Treaty fails to state explicitly the supremacy of
Community laws over the municipal law of the member nations,
it also fails to provide clearly for many of the safeguards guaranteed by those instruments.' In response to these challenges, the
Court of Justice has stated that the general principles of Community law comprise fundamental rights and that the Court is
required to safeguard these rights2' This line of reasoning is reinforced by InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft, in which the Court
refused to allow EEC regulations to be tested against member
states' constitutions and insisted that the Court would insure the
respect for fundamental rights within the framework of the EEC.
It was noted that the fundamental rights that are to be protected
26. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fAr
Getreide und Futtermittel, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8126 (1970).
27. For a detailed discussion of this development see Sasse, The Common
Market: Between Internationaland Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695 (1966).
28. For detailed analysis of the conflict between Community law and national
law of a constitutional rank see C. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 25-46, 349-60, 417-32 (1972).
29. The EEC was adopted in member states as a treaty. Thus, the effect of
the Treaty and through that the supremacy of community law are determined by
the place of international treaties in the individual member states legal systems.
See note 6 supra. For example, article 66 of the Netherlands Constitution provides
that any provision of municipal law is overridden by a prior or subsequent treaty
and article 60(3) states that the constitutionality of a treaty may not be challenged. On the other hand, while article 24(1) of the Basic Law of Germany
provides for the transfer of sovereign powers to intergovernmental institutions,
the supremacy of Community laws over fundamental German constitutional principles is far from clear. See A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 7, at 152-55.
30. See Zuleeg, Fundamental Rights and the Law of the European
Communities, 8 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 446 (1971).
31.

Stauder v. City of Ulm, 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 112, 119 (1969).
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by the Court of Justice will be derived from the common constitutional traditions of the member states if these guarantees are reconcilable with the goals and purposes of the Community. Several
members of the EEC, as evidenced by the Italian Government's
position in this case and the recent referral to the German Constitutional Court of the InternationaleHandelsgesellschaftcase, however, seem to have serious reservations about the Court of Justice's
innovative policy on behalf of European integration. This reluctance definitely presents a situation that will require much cooperation among the member states to protect the effectiveness of the
EEC and to reach a solution to this problem that is feasible from
the points of view of both the legal and the political systems in
which the European Communities must operate.
Jeffery R. Rush
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DISCOVERY-AID

TO FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
-UNITED STATES COURTS CAN COMPEL TESTIMONY ONLY ON BEHALF
OF FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS EMPOWERED TO MAKE
BINDING ADJUDICATIONS

A Canadian Commission' of Inquiry presented letters rogatory
to the District Court for the Northern District of California requesting assistance in obtaining the testimony of plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides the procedures for the
rendering of assistance to foreign or international tribunals by
United States courts. The court issued an ex parte order appointing three commissioners3 to execute the letters rogatory and issued
a subpoena to plaintiff to compel his testimony before the Commission. Plaintiff moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that
28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorizes the court to compel testimony only
before foreign or international tribunals with adjudicative powers,
and that the Commission, therefore, was not a "tribunal" within
the meaning of section 1782. Counsel for the Commission opposed
the motion on the ground that adjudicative power is not a requirement for qualification as a tribunal under the 1964 amendment to
section 1782.1 In the District Court for the Northern District of
1. The Commission was created to investigate all aspects of the Pas Forestry
and Industrial Complex Project and report its findings to the legislature and the
Executive. The Pas Project was a program pursuant to which the Government of
Manitoba loaned substantial sums of money to private companies for the development of timber resources in northern Manitoba. Routine inspections concerning
this project disclosed that Government loans on the project had been misappropriated and that the bulk of the monies advanced had been removed from Canada. Part V of the Manitoba Evidence Act, R.S.M., C.E. 150, and Order in
Council No. 94/71 authorized the investigation.
2. James L. Ziegler is a United States citizen residing in Tiburon, California.
Ziegler is a former employee of Arthur D. Little, Inc., a management consulting
firm intimately connected with the Pas Project throughout its history.
3. As is the practice in cases involving letters rogatory from a foreign tribunal,
the commissioners appointed by the district court to depose plaintiff were those
requested by the foreign tribunal in its letters. See Smit, InternationalLitigation
Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1013 (1965).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1970), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1964). Section 1782
was amended in 1964 to change substantially United States procedure for rendering judicial assistance to foreign agencies. It now provides that "[t]he district
court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be made purSpring, 1974
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California, held, motion to quash granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorizes a United States District Court to compel testimony on
behalf of a foreign or international "tribunal," which, within the
meaning of the Act, includes only those bodies empowered to make
binding adjudications of fact or law affecting litigants in concrete
cases. In Re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses From the
Court of Queens Bench for Manitoba, Canada,59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd, No. 73-1978 (9th Cir., Nov. 21, 1973).
The 1949 version of section 17821 provided for United States
judicial assistance' in obtaining testimony for use in a "judicial
proceeding ' 7 in a foreign country.8 Motivated by the volume of
international litigation and aware of the problems in obtaining
evidence under the 1949 provision,9 Congress sought to streamline
suant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international
tribunal or upon the application of any interested person ....
"
5. The first act passed by Congress to render assistance to foreign litigants was
the Act of March 2, 1855, 10 Stat. 630, which provided for executing foreign letters
rogatory. Later the Act was amended to authorize an appropriate district court
to take the deposition of a witness for use in a "suit for the recovery of money or
property pending in a foreign country . . ." (12 Stat. 769 (1863)), and "[i]n any
civil action pending in any court in a foreign country." 62 Stat. 949 (1948).
6. The term "judicial assistance" includes the use of the subpoena to compel
testimony as well as the court's inherent contempt powers. See H. SMrr & A.
MILLER, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION-A REPORT ON PRACTICES

(1961).
7. Professor Smit felt the use of the term "judicial proceeding" in the 1949
Act did not necessarily include an investigating magistrate. Nor did the term
include administrative tribunals, since these are considered quasi-judicial in nature. Id. at 13.
8. "The deposition of any witness within the United States to be used in any
judicial proceeding in any court in a foreign country with which the United States
is at peace may be taken before a person authorized to administer oaths designated by the district court of any district where the witness resides or may be
found." Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103, amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (Supp. II, 1946).
9. The procedural problems involved in obtaining evidence in the United
States for a foreign proceeding prior to the 1964 amendment were formidable. The
procedure began with a request by the foreign court sent to its embassy in Washington, which transmitted it to the Department of State for forwarding to the
appropriate district court. The State Department frequently refused to forward
the letters rogatory. This severely hampered foreign litigants, since foreign law
frequently required that letters rogatory or requests be handled only through
diplomatic channels. The State Department changed its policy in 1962 to facilitate forwarding letters rogatory to the appropriate court. Foreign litigants still
AND PROCEDURES PREVAILING IN THE UNITED STATES
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procedures and to broaden the grant of judicial assistance to foreign agencies not heretofore included."0 Accordingly, the 1964
amendment to section 17821 provides for the issuance of a subpoena to require testimony for use in a proceeding 2 by a foreign or
international "tribunal."' 3 The legislative history of the amendment suggests that the use of the word "tribunal" was a deliberate
attempt to broaden the scope of United States judicial assistance
to encompass proceedings beyond those of conventional courts.'4 In
In Re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the
Government of India,'5 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cirfaced a major obstacle once they reached the district courts. The courts, if they
granted the request at all, required the information-gathering process to conform
to domestic procedures. Thus, United States assistance frequently proved useless
to foreign litigants, particularly those whose civil law courts were incapable of
assimilating information gathered under the common law adversary discovery
processes. Note, Discovery, 10 HAiv. INT'L L.J. 172, 178 (1969).
10. On September 2, 1958, Congress established the Advisory Committee on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure to study the problems of administering
judicial assistance to foreign agencies. Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85906, § 5, 72 Stat. 1744. This Committee worked in conjunction with the Columbia
Law School Project on International Procedure. The culmination of this joint
effort was the 1964 amendment to section 1782.
11. Unlike its predecessor, § 1782, as amended, provides for United States
judicial assistance in obtaining documentary and tangible evidence as well as the
oral testimony of a witness. The amendment recognizes that it is fruitless to
distinguish between types of evidence sought in view of the goal of international
cooperation. Smit, supra note 3, at 1026.
12. It should be noted that under § 1782, as amended, the proceedings need
not be in session at the time the request for assistance is made.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. The reports of the Judiciary Committees of both houses offered the following explanation for the 1964 amendment: "A rather large number of requests for
assistance emanate from investigating magistrates. The word 'tribunal' is used
to make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional
courts. For example, it is intended that the court have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before investigating magistrates in foreign
countries . . . . In view of the constant growth of administrative and quasijudicial proceedings all over the world, the necessity for obtaining evidence in the
United States may be as impelling in proceedings before a foreign administrative
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a conventional foreign
court. Subsection (a) therefore provides the possibility of U.S. judicial assistance
in connection with all such proceedings." H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1963); S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
15. 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
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cuit'" held that an inquiry before an Indian Income Tax Officer was
not a proceeding before a foreign tribunal within the meaning of
section 1782. The court based this determination on an examination of whether the adjudicative function'7 was separate from the
prosecutorial function in the purported tribunal.' 8 Under the
court's guideline, a tribunal is vested exclusively with adjudicative
powers, and the addition of prosecutorial functions will remove the
characterization of tribunal. Likewise, a body that is vested exclusively with prosecutorial functions is not a tribunal. The court
found that since the Tax Officer had sole responsibility for collecting data and for evaluating the government's case against the taxpayer," there was no significant separation between the adjudicative and prosecutorial functions and thus the Tax Officer was not
a tribunal within the meaning of section 1782.0 As an example of
a body in which the combination of the two functions comports
with section 1782, the court offered the Frenchjuge d'instruction,2 '
16. Judge Friendly wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit.
17. Judge Friendly offered the adjudicative-prosecutorial standard not as a
test, but only as a useful guideline. 385 F.2d at 1021.
18. The court engaged in an elaborate study of Indian Income Tax procedure
and concluded that the function of the Income Tax Officer is to levy an assessment and not to finally adjudicate the issue of an individual's tax liability. 385
F.2d at 1022.
19. In support of its finding that the Tax Officer's activities are limited to the
levying function, the court cited the Indian case of S.S. Gadgill v. Lal & Co., 53
I.T.R. 231 (1964), which held: "The income-tax authorities who have power to
assess and recover tax are not acting as judges deciding a litigation between the
citizen and the State: they are administrative authorities whose proceedings are
regulated by statute, but whose function is to estimate the income of the taxpayer
and to assess him to tax on the basis of that estimate. Tax legislation necessitates
the setting up of machinery to ascertain the taxable income and to assess tax on
that income, but that does not impress the proceeding with the character of an
action between citizen and state." 53 I.T.R. at 238, quoted in 385 F.2d at 1020.
20. Finding the Indian system for tax collection very similar to that of the
United States, the court took judicial notice of the fact that a tax assessor does
not comport with traditional notions of what constitutes a "tribunal." Thus, the
court reasoned, Congress did not intend to include tax assessors in the term
"tribunal." "Congressmen, who have doubtless had their income tax returns
audited and sometimes questioned like the rest of us, would hardly have considered that the procedures of the Internal Revenue Service leading to a determination of deficiency or an assessment were proceedings in a 'tribunal'." 385 F.2d at
1021.
21. The juge d'instructionoccupies a place in the French legal system somewhat parallel to that of the grand jury in the Anglo-American system. The juge
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whose function is to determine whether there is probable cause to
bind an accused over for trial in a criminal case. Unlike the Tax
Officer, the court reasoned, the juge represents neither the interests of the accused nor those of the prosecution2 and thus has the
objectivity normally associated with a tribunal.? It has been suggested that the Second Circuit's use of the juge as a standard of
comparison is too restrictive in view of the House and Senate Reports' liberal interpretation of the term "tribunal,

' 24

and that the

investigating magistrate is not the outer limit of the term's meaning .? The court was careful to point out, however, that by imposing
the adjudicative-prosecutorial standard it did not hold that a foreign agency must satisfy all the requirements for an adjudicative
body under the Administrative Procedure Act 2 to qualify as a
tribunal 21 under section 1782.21

In the instant case, the court recognized that the purpose of the
1964 amendment was to expand the scope of United States judicial
assistance to foreign agencies seeking to gather information and
testimony in the United States. 2 The court, however, believed that
usually enters the case at the request of the procureur, the counterpart of the
district attorney. Once thejuge has the case before him, he assumes a more active
role than the grand jury would. He is in charge of the investigation though he
delegates the detective work to the police. See Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle,
9 AM. J. COMP. L. 441 (1960).
22. Id. at 443.
23. 385 F.2d at 1020.
24. See note 14 supra.
25. The Committee reports make reference to the juge, but do not offer the
juge as a standard. Some writers have criticized the Second Circuit for imposing
the juge as a standard that the Indian Income Tax Officer failed to meet. It has
been suggested that a more flexible standard should be imposed which would
allow the benefits of § 1782 to an institution even if it performs a nonadjudicative
function so long as the privileges of a witness are honored. Note, supra note 9, at
183.
26. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
27. The court also stated that it was of no consequence that under the laws
of India, the proceedings before a tax officer were held to be a judicial proceeding.
385 F.2d at 1021.
28. 385 F.2d at 1020. "On the other hand, that concept is not so broad as to
include all the plethora of administrators whose decisions affect private parties
and who are not entitled to act arbitrarily . . . ." 385 F.2d at 1021.
29. The court cited the transmittal letter to President Kennedy from the
Chairman of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, which
drafted and recommended the proposed amendment: "Until recently, the United
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Congress did not intend to extend the scope of judicial assistance
to foreign agencies whose purpose is to investigate and report to the
legislative or executive branch of their governments. 3 The court
reached this conclusion after reviewing the Judiciary Committee
Reports of both houses of Congress, which contained repeated reference to "litigants" and "litigation" in their discussion of the
scope of the proposed amendment.3 1 As in In Re Letters Rogatory
32
Issued by the Directorof Inspection of the Government of India,
the court disregarded the characterization of the foreign agency
under local law.3 3 Though the court agreed that the Canadian
States has not engaged itself fully in efforts to improve practices of international
cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing involvement of the United States
in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and
other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation. Enactment of the proposed bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United States to
the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those sister nations and
thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals
and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects." 385 F.2d at 1019
n.1.
This statement of purpose was adopted by the Judiciary Committees of both
Houses of Congress. H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963); S. REP.
No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
30. In a footnote, the court said: "The Commissioner points to language in the
House and Senate Reports to the effect: 'If the court fails to prescribe the procedure, the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be
followed, irrespective of whether the foreign or international proceeding or investigation is of a criminal, civil, administrative or other nature.' "The court said that
this language prescribes only the procedure to be followed once a valid request
has been honored. "Use of the term 'investigation' and 'or other nature' recognizes
that an adjudicative tribunal may be a body which conducts investigations. But
it does not appear to indicate that a body whose sole function is to conduct an
investigation on behalf of a legislative or executive agency is a tribunal within the
meaning of the statute." 59 F.R.D. at 629 n.7.
31. See note 30 supra.
32. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
33. In an effort to show that the Commission was a "tribunal," the Commission pointed to Order in Council 94/71, which authorized the Commission "to
inquire into, ascertain and report upon the facts and circumstances relating to
the development of the forestry and industrial complex near the Pas

. .

. and to

make recommendations." Furthermore, the Commissioners argued that their inquiry was a "legal proceeding" within the meaning of subsection (f) and constituted a "court" within the meaning of subsection (d) of the Manitoba Evidence
Act, R.S.M., C.E. 150. The Act in pertinent part defines "legal proceeding" as
"any civil proceeding, inquiry, or arbitration, in which evidence is or may be
Vol. 7-No. 2
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Commission has many of the attributes of a tribunal, 3' it held that
binding adjudicative power over the rights of litigants in concrete
cases is essential for an agency to qualify as a tribunal within the
meaning of section 1782.15
This decision represents a retreat from the broad purpose" of the
1964 amendment since it requires a purported tribunal to have
binding adjudicative power 3 to receive United States judicial assistance in gathering information. This requirement is reminiscent
of the focus on conventional courts that dominated the 1949 version of the statute.3 8 It can be argued that even the example of the
juge d'instruction39 would not satisfy the requirement set forth in
this case.40 The court seems to believe that the existence of the
domestic court's power to object to the performance of procedural
acts within its jurisdiction is sufficient reason for exercising that
power." This attitude is puzzling since one of the primary purposes
given," and "court" as a "court, judge, arbitrator, commissioner, or person before
whom a legal proceeding is held or taken."
34. For example, the Commission has the power to summon witnesses to
appear before the Commission by subpoena and, in appropriate cases, by warrant, and the power to punish witnesses for refusal to take an oath or refusal to
testify by committing the witness to jail for a period of one month. In addition,
the Commission is protected by the same judicial immunity as judges sitting on
the Court of Queen's Bench. Brief for Appellant at 12.
35. 59 F.R.D. at 630.
36. The 1949 version, its predecessor, granted judicial cooperation to conventional courts. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
37. 59 F.R.D. at 630-31.
38. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 22 supra.
40. It is doubtful that the juge d'instructionmakes a "binding adjudication
of the facts or law as related to the rights of litigants in concrete cases," which is
the language the court used t6 define "tribunal" in the context of § 1782. 59
F.R.D. at 630. After making a full investigation of the facts, the juge merely
recommends in more serious crimes that the Chambre d'Accusation bind the
accused for trial in the Cour d'Assises. This recommendation is not binding on
the Chambre. Furthermore, as in the case of some grand juries in the United
States, often the juge is asked to investigate an incident in which there are no
readily ascertainable suspects. Anton, L'instruction Criminelle, 9 Am.J. Comp.
L. 441, 454-57 (1960). It might be said that in that instance, there is but one
litigant-the state-and no real concrete case, and until such time as there is,
the juge is not a tribunal worthy of judicial assistance in obtaining testimony
under this court's holding.
41. Professor Smit criticized this approach when taken by foreign courts. He
states that it would be difficult to imagine valid reasons for objecting to the
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of the amendment was to set an example for other nations to follow
in liberalizing their practices and procedures in the area of judicial
cooperation." It should be noted that Congress established no precise guidelines for defining the term "tribunal."43 The lack of
guidelines might well have been purposeful44 in view of the intent
of the act.45 The 1964 amendment was enacted to promote the
policy of effective judicial assistance in the face of increasing commercial intercourse among nations and the corresponding increase
in international litigation. 6 Implementation of this policy of cooperation requires a district court to object to the performance of
procedural acts within its jurisdiction only if the interest in doing
so outweighs the interest in promoting the administration of justice on the international level. 7 Factors that might be considered
are: (1) will there be prejudice to the witnesses; (2) does the compulsion of testimony under the circumstances violate local law; (3)
will the constitutional and evidentiary privileges of the witnesses
be honored; (4) is there any compelling domestic interest present,
such as national security, that would be served by denying aid; and
(5) could the court mould a protective order that would adequately
safeguard the interests present in the foregoing considerations. A
consideration of these factors, which are not meant to be exclusive,
would relieve a court of a detailed analysis of the nature of an
unfamiliar foreign institution. Moreover, these factors would harperformance of procedural acts in a jurisdiction when no violation of local law is
involved. Smit, supra note 3, at 1018.
42. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in urging passage of the 1964 Amendment, said: "It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures will invite foreign countries to similarly adjust their procedures." S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963); S.REP. No. 1580,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
44. See Note, supra note 9.
45. A district court is granted a good deal of discretion in granting aid to
foreign tribunals. According to the Senate Committee, § 1782(a) "leaves the
issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court which, in proper
cases, may refuse to issue an order or may impose conditions it deems desirable.
In exercising its discretionary power, the court may take into account the nature
and attitudes of the government of the country. . . or in the case of proceedings
before an international tribunal, the nature of the tribunal and the character of
the proceedings before it." 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3788.
46. See note 30 supra.
47. See Smit, supra note 3.
48. See generally Note, supra note 9.
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monize the administration of section 1782 with the purpose of the
statute. The 1964 amendment to section 1782 gave recognition to
the increasing resolution of controversies outside of conventional
courts throughout the world: judicial assistance must be rendered
to these forums to facilitate their task. As an increasing number
of United States citizens engage in international trade and become
involved in international disputes, it is in this nation's best interests to aid these nonconventional forums in quickly resolving the
controversies before them. Under the 1964 amendment, no purpose
is served by such scrutiny of these foreign institutions in terms of
their proximity to the function of a conventional court as that
presented in the instant case.
Frank R. Krok
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EXTRADITION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-MERE ABSENCE IS
NOT EQUIVALENT TO FLEEING FROM JUSTICE UNDER

18 U.S.C. § 3290

Petitioner, a resident alien in the United States, sought a writ
of habeus corpus,' attacking the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate to determine the appropriateness of his extradition to
India pursuant to the Treaty of December 22, 1931.2 Petitioner,
who was charged with embezzlement of India's Naval Prize Fund
between 1959 and 1961, 3 argued that the Treaty bars extradition
1. A petition for habeas corpus is the only means of attacking the determination by a magistrate concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
charged offense under an applicable treaty of extradition. 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1970). The petition for habeas corpus was filed prior to the extradition hearing
before the magistrate, which is permissible under unusual circumstances. 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1970). Although the premature use of a writ of habeas corpus is
discouraged in extradition proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970), the district court
agreed to consider the petition before the magistrate's hearing because of the
unusual circumstances. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903). The petition had
not been heard for nearly five months due to the death of the judge to whom the
case had been originally assigned. The respondent also argued that petitioner did
not meet the "in custody" requirement of the habeas corpus statute. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1970). The instant court ruled, however, that although the alleged fugitive was free on bail pending extradition, the restrictions on his freedom implicit
in his being on bail were such that he could be considered "in custody" and the
district court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for habeas corpus.
2. 47 Stat. 2122, 163 L.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter cited as Treaty]. The original
signatories to this Treaty were the United States and Great Britain. Article 14
stated that Great Britain could accede to the Treaty on behalf of certain listed
territories, one of which was India. Both the government of India and the government of the United States have been unequivocal in relying on the validity of the
Treaty and in the past there have been extraditions from both counties. Article 1
provides that "[tihe High Contracting Parties engaged to deliver up to each
other, under certain circumstances and conditions stated in the present Treaty,
those persons who, being accused or convicted of any of the crimes or offences
enumerated in Article 3, committed within the jurisdiction of the one Party, shall
be found within the territory of the other party." Petitioner argued that embezzlement was not an extraditable offense under the Treaty. The court ruled, however,
that the offense of breach of trust is within the Republic of India statute providing
that whoever being entrusted with property dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property in violation of any direction of law is guilty of
criminal breach of trust, in essence, the crime of embezzlement.
3. Petitioner continued in his position as administrator of the fund until 1964.
In 1966, petitioner traveled to Switzerland, where he remained for a short time.
He then emigrated to Israel, where he held a high government position, before
coming to the United States on a permanent resident visa. No charges were filed
against him until 1968, two years after he left India. Petitioner contended that
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since under United States law' the five-year statute of limitations'
had expired. Respondent contended that the statute of limitations
was tolled under United States law7 because petitioner was
"fleeing from justice."8 Petitioner argued that his mere absence
from India did not constitute fleeing from justice and therefore the
statute of limitations was not tolled. The district court found that
the statute was tolled, and refused to issue the writ. On rehearing,
the district court again refused. On appeal to the United States
he was not aware of any charges against him until he was arrested in New York
in 1972.
4. Article 5 of the Treaty allows the application of United States law in determining whether extradition is permissible: "The extradition shall not take place
if, subsequently .to the commission of the crime or offence or the institution of
the penal prosecution or the conviction thereon, exemption from prosecution or
punishment has been acquired by lapse of time, according to the laws of the High
Contracting Party applying or applied to."
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970) states: "[Upon complaint made under oath, charging
any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so
charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge or magistrate, to the
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such
hearings, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with
a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a
warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign
government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the
treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the
person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender is
made."
5. The federal statute of limitations for noncapital offenses provides: "Except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been
committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
6. The United States Marshall is the nominal respondent, while the Government of India is the real respondent.
7. The tolling provision of the federal statute states that "[n~o statute of
limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3290
(1970).
8. Petitioner left India on July 26, 1966, which, if it constituted "fleeing from
justice," would have tolled the statute as to those offenses occurring less than five
years before his departure. Therefore, petitioner could be extradited for alleged
transactions on July 27, 1961, September 25, 1961 and September 27, 1961, although he was charged with 52 separate embezzlements.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. Mere absence from the jurisdiction seeking extradition is
not sufficient to constitute fleeing from justice under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3290; an intent to flee from prosecution must be shown before
the statute of limitations is tolled and extradition is permitted.
Jhiradv. Ferrandina,486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973).
The federal courts have disagreed on the interpretation of
"fleeing from justice" in the tolling provision of the statute of
limitations. Most of the confusion is derived from three early Supreme Court cases in which the Court used interchangeably the
phrases "fugitive from justice," which is found in the statute that
allows for extradition between the states,9 and "fleeing from justice," which is found in the tolling provision.10 In Roberts v.
Reilly," an extradition case, defendant contended that he could
not be a fugitive from justice because he had left the jurisdiction
before an indictment was returned. The Supreme Court held that
for purposes of extradition, a fugitive from justice need not have
left the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution, but only to have departed
and been found elsewhere.' 2 Thus, for purposes of extradition, 3 the
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970). This provision states that "[wihenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from
justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person
has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before
a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having
committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor
or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged
has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which a
person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the authority making such demand ..

10. See note 7 supra.
11. 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
12. "To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of an act of Congress regulating
the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged should
have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after
an indictment [is] found, or for the purpose of avoiding prosecution anticipated
or begun, but simply that having within a State committed that which by its laws
constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to
answer for his offence, he has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory
of another." 116 U.S. at 97.
13. Extradition agreements have one primary purpose, to return an accused
to a jurisdiction to face charges against him, and the absent person's intentions
or reasons for leaving the jurisdiction have no bearing on that purpose. Appleyard
v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 231 (1906).
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reasons for being absent from the jurisdiction are irrelevant. The
second case, Streep v. United States, 4 appears to be the case from
which most of the confusion emanates. Interpreting the tolling of
the statute of limitation provision of section 1045 of the Revised
Statutes, 5 the Streep Court held that to constitute fleeing from
justice the accused must have left the jurisdiction with the intention of avoiding prosecution for a particular offense, regardless
whether prosecution had been instituted. The Court also stated
that in this respect, i.e. whether prosecution had been commenced,
the tolling provision should receive the same construction as the
extradition provision. The Court then reiterated its holding in the
Roberts case-that fugitive from justice does not necessarily mean
that the defendant intended to avoid prosecution. Thus, the Court
laid the groundwork for the subsequent confusion by ruling that
the tolling provision and the extradition provision should receive
the same construction concerning the commencement of prosecution while concluding that intent is necessary to constitute fleeing
from justice but not necessary to make the accused a fugitive from
justice. 6 Although not always in point, Streep has been cited in
support of differing views in almost every subsequent opinion on
the relevance of intent under section 3290. In a subsequent extradition case, Appleyard v. Massachusetts,'7 defendant, who had left
the jurisdiction without knowing that he had committed a crime,
argued that the Streep language meant that the extradition and
tolling statutes should have identical constructions not only on the
question of the commencement of prosecution but also on the question of intent." Defendant then argued that since intent is relevant
in tolling provision cases under Streep, intent should be relevant
in extradition cases. The Court adopted a narrow reading of
Streep, however, and held the reason for defendant's absence irrelevant under the extradition statute. Thus, the Court ignored
Streep's reference to the intent requirement in connection with the
tolling provision and concluded that Roberts had not been modified. ' The lower federal courts and the state courts, however, have
14. 160 U.S. 128 (1895).
15. Rev. Stat. § 1045 (1873-74), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1970).
16. 160 U.S. at 133-34.
17. 203 U.S. 222 (1906).
18. 203 U.S. at 229.
19. "Interpreting the words 'fleeing from justice' as found in [the tolling]
section, the court [in Streep] expressly held that these words must receive the
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failed to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in these decisions.
The prevailing line of authority holds that absence from the jurisdiction, regardless of intent, tolls the statute of limitations. Thus
in In re Bruce"0 the court, interpreting a New Jersey statute of
limitations essentially identical to section 3290, found the Streep
analogy to the extradition statute controlling and declared that it
was immaterial that petitioner had left the state openly and in a
legitimate pursuit of his business. Subsequently, in McGowen v.
United States,21 the court, citing In re Bruce, stated that the
Streep case expressly applied the language of Roberts v. Reilly22 to
section 3290; the court, therefore, found that appellant was fleeing
from justice when he left the district, regardless of his motive for
leaving. 3 In contrast, the minority view holds that fleeing from
justice means leaving one's usual place of abode and concealing
oneself either inside or outside the jurisdiction for the purpose of
avoiding prosecution. The jury must then decide whether the requisite intent existed. In Brouse v. United States,2 the court described fleeing from justice as absence or concealment with the
intent to avoid punishment and stated that whether the accused
is fleeing from justice is a question of fact to be determined from
the acts and intent of the accused. Many cases have taken a similar position,25 the most recent of which is Donnell v. United
States.26 The majority and dissenting opinions in Donnell reflect
the dichotomous reasoning that has developed in the wake of the
Streep decision. The Donnell majority supported its position that
intent is relevant in statute of limitation cases by relying on refersame construction as was given in Roberts v. Reilly to like words in [the extradition] section . . . .the inquiry in that case being whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice." 203 U.S. at 229-30.
20. 132 F. 390 (C.C. Md. 1904), aff'd sub nom. Bruce v. Bryan, 136 F. 1022
(4th Cir. 1905).
21. 105 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 552 (1939).
22. 116 U.S. at 97; see note 12 supra.
23. 105 F.2d at 792. There have been numerous other cases following this line
of authority. E.g., Green v. United States, 188 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 955 (1951); King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 854 (1944).
24. 68 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1933).
25. E.g., Ferebee v. United States, 295 F. 850 (4th Cir. 1924); Greene v. United
States, 154 F. 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 596 (1907); Porter v. United
States, 91 F. 494 (5th Cir. 1898).
26. 229 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1956).
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ences to intent in the Streep and Brouse decisions. The court concluded that the purposes of section 3290 and those of the extradition statute are too dissimilar to justify applying the same language.27 The dissent, however, relying on the reference in Streep
to Roberts v. Reilly, urged that a definite standard making intent
irrelevant would avoid unnecessarily lengthy litigation concerning
the statute of limitations before the substantive issues are
reached. 2 Decisions of this type reflect the seeming equivocality of
the Streep opinion and explain the divergence among the circuits.
In the instant case, the court initially held that the 1931 extradition treaty is valid between the United States and India. The court
then looked to the federal law of the United States to determine
whether extradition was barred by the statute of limitations."
After recognizing the conflict among the courts of appeals on the
interpretation of section 3290,3" the court chose to follow the line
of authority that construes fleeing from justice as requiring intent
to avoid prosecution. The court stated that the phrase "fleeing
from justice" carries a common sense connotation that only those
persons who have intentionally absented themselves from the jurisdiction of the crime will be denied the benefit of the statute of
limitations. Therefore, because of the plain language and purpose
of section 3290, the government must show an intent to flee before
the statute is tolled and extradition is permissible.
Although following the minority view, this court properly determined that the fleeing from justice provision in the statute of limitations requires intent and, therefore, cannot be given the same
interpretation as the fugitive from justice provision in the extradition statute. The statute of limitations and the extradition statute
serve very different purposes. Extradition is a procedural mechanism for returning an accused to the jurisdiction where the offense
was committed to stand trial. A hearing is held to insure that there
is sufficient evidence of an extraditable crime. The hearing also
27. 229 F.2d at 562-64.
28. 229 F.2d at 567.
29. The court did not discuss its reasons for applying United States law,
apparently accepting the lower court's reasoning, which is as follows: "The basic
intention of international treaties of extradition is uniform, regularized extradition between nations. Because of an overriding federal interest in treaties of
extradition, federal law shall be controlling in limitations questions." 355 F.
Supp. 1155, 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
30. 486 F.2d at 444.
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prevents extradition for political harassment or other impermissible motives. It seems logical in the application of extradition statutes that the intent with which the accused departed should not
be relevant. In fact, if intent were relevant, an innocent departure
from a jurisdiction would be sufficient to make a criminal immune
from extradition because he could not be a fugitive for lack of
intent. If the rule applicable to extradition statutes is applied to
the tolling of the statute of limitations, it may provide a simple
and convenient test,3' but it fails to consider the fundamental purpose of a statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is designed to prevent a trial so long after the alleged offense has been
committed that the accused may be unable to locate his witnesses
or produce his evidence. Also, the statute removes the threat of
prosecution after a specified number of years, so that a potential
defendant is given assurance he can lead a normal life after the
expiration of that period. The protection provided by the statute
of limitations, however, will be denied a person who flees from
justice before the statute has run. It is illogical to assume that a
person can flee from justice unless he intends to do so. Therefore,
the intention to avoid prosecution should be present before the
statute is tolled. The purposes of a statute of limitations should
also be recognized in foreign extradition cases. There is little difference in applying 18 U.S.C. § 3290 to extradition between the
states, and to extradition from the United States to a foreign country.2 In the latter instance there must be a treaty between the
parties before the extradition can occur.3 Under the treaty applicable in this case the court is simply construing two provisions of
federal law, just as in extradition between the states. Therefore,
31. The test simply states that if the defendant is absent from the jurisdiction
he is "fleeing from justice," and any determination of intent is unnecessary. 229
F.2d at 567.
32. Because each state is an independent jurisdiction, the states must look to
federal law to determine whether extradition is available. Similarly, two nations
must look to a treaty to make the same determination. If the law of the United
States is controlling, the application of the law is identical to that in the situation
involving two states.
33. Although extradition by international comity and cooperation occurs, the
United States does not extradite persons to another country unless extradition is
authorized by treaty. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1970); see Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 287 (1933); Wise, Some Problems of Extradition,15 WAYNE L. REv. 709,
714 (1969).
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the policy behind the statute of limitations should be recognized
in extradition under this treaty, as well as in extradition between
the states. Thus, this court reached the proper decision, that intent
is necessary to flee from justice, by simply looking to the purposes
of the statute. Although the court did not consider it, evidence of
congressional intent concerning section 3290 provides further support for the proposition that intent is a necessary element of flight
from justice. Congress resolved any doubt concerning the interpretation of section 3290 in 1954 when the Internal Revenue Code of
193911 was revised. The 1939 Code used the word "absent" in the
tolling provision for crimes under the Internal Revenue Code, as
distinguished from "fleeing from justice" language applicable to
other noncapital offenses. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code
changed the "absence" standard; Congress incorporated by reference the "fleeing from justice" standard of section 3290.11 This
change illustrates that Congress interpreted "absence" differently
from "fleeing from justice," and that absence alone is not sufficient
to constitute fleeing from justice. There would have been no reason
to eliminate the "absence" standard and to incorporate by reference the "intent" standard required by section 3290 unless Congress believed that section 3290 required something more than
mere absence. Therefore, the Jhiradcourt correctly examined the
purpose of the statutes, congressional intent and the equities of the
situation before making its determination whether intent is necessary to flee from justice under section 3290. When all these factors
are considered, it becomes evident that the provisions of the two
statutes should not be given the same interpretation. The courts,
34. Section 6531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 contained the following
clause: "The time during which the person committing any of the offenses above
mentioned is absent from the district wherein the same is committed shall not
be taken as any part of the time limited by law for the commencement of such
proceeding." INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 36, § 3748(a), 53 Stat. 461, as amended,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6531(8) (emphasis added).
35. Section 6531(8) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 reads as follows:
"The time during which the person committing any of the various offenses arising
under the internal revenue laws is outside the United States or is a fugitive from
justice within the meaning of section 3290 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
shall not be taken as any part of the time limited by law for commencement of
such proceedings. (The preceeding sentence shall also be deemed an amendment
to section 3748(a) which relates to the time during which a person committing
an offense is absent from the district wherein the same is committed ...
INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6531(8).
"
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as did this case, should require an intent for the application of the
tolling provision of section 3290 and thereby effectuate the purposes of the statute and congressional intent.
Paul P. Sanford
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE-PROCEDURE- TEMPORARY RELIEF IN THE FORM OF INTERIM MEASURES GRANTED ON
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTION AND JURISDICTION OF THE
MERITS FOUND ON BASIS OF PRIOR AGREEMENT TO COMPULSORY I.C.J.
JURISDICTION

Based on a 1961 bilateral agreement,' the United Kingdom filed
in April 1972 an Application against Iceland before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)2 seeking a declaration that Iceland's
extention of its fisheries jurisdiction to 50 nautical miles3 was un1. The 1961 bilateral agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement)
signed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Iceland moderated the dispute between the two countries over the
fisheries rights off Iceland's coast. The dispute, often referred to as the Cod War,
had been developing for over ten years and had involved numerous naval incidents in the fishery area. See 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116978 (1965). The Agreement provides: that Britain undertake not to object to Iceland's twelve-mile limit while Iceland promised to permit British vessels to fish
in certain areas during certain times of the year within the outer six miles of the
zone; that this permission would expire in three years; that Iceland would continue to work for the further extension of her fisheries jurisdiction and would give
Britain six-months notice of any such extension; and most importantly to this
case, that any dispute which arose would, at the request of either party, be
referred to the International Court of Justice. Exchange of Notes Constituting an
Agreement Between Iceland and the United Kingdom Settling the Fisheries Dispute, Mar. 11, 1961, 397 U.N.T.S. 275. The Federal Republic of Germany reached
a similar agreement, which also was broken and which resulted in a companion
suit to the present case. Application was filed on June 5, 1972.
2. In 1946, with the creation of the United Nations, the Permanent Court of
International Justice was replaced by the International Court of Justice. See U.N.
CHARTER, Ch. XIV, arts. 92-96. For descriptions of the ICJ see 0. LissrrzYN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1951); S.ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965); 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1, ch. 37 (1971).
3. Iceland proclaimed the extension in the Resolution on Fisheries
Jurisdictionissued by Iceland's Althing on February 15, 1972, and brought to an
end eleven years of near harmony based on the Agreement. The Resolution:
unilaterally extended Iceland's fishery limits to 50 miles from baselines around
the country; declared that the Agreement was no longer applicable; supported
continued discussions with the United Kingdom; emphasized that the fishstocks
of Iceland should be effectively supervised; and authorized the Government to
take measures to prevent marine pollution. Resolution of the Althing Concerning
Fisheries Jurisdiction, Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 643
(1972). For an informative discussion of the fisheries aspects of this dispute see
Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 37 (1973). For
discussion of fisheries jurisdiction in general see J. CRUTCHFIELD, THE FISHERIES:
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founded under international law.' Additionally, in July 1972, the
United Kingdom requested that the ICJ declare interim protective
measures, 5 which were granted, and in June 1973 requested confirmation of the continuation of these measures.' The Court ordered
pleadings on the question of jurisdiction in August 1972. 7 Throughout this dispute the United Kingdom has contended that the ICJ
has jurisdiction because the compromissory clause in the 1961 bilateral agreement established the intent of the parties to confer
jurisdiction on the Court over any substantive or procedural dispute;8 that the Court should grant interim measures because any
interruption of the British fishing rights would cause irremediable
damage to British interests;9 and that the Court should continue,
for the same reasons, the measures until the decision on the merits
PROBLEMS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

(1965); D.

JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL

(1965).
4. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice specifies the
sources of international law to be applied by the Court: "1. the Court, whose
function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b.
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto." I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.
5. The United Kingdom request for interim measures of protection of July 19,
1972, was granted by the Court on August 17, 1972. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(Order Concerning the Request for Interim Measures of Protection), [1972]
I.C.J. -, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1069 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Interim Measures]. For a summary of the interim measures see note 44 infra.
6. The United Kingdom, in a request dated June 22, 1973, asked the Court
to confirm that the interim measures of protection would continue until a final
judgment or a further order. This request was granted on July 12, 1973. Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (Order Concerning the Continuance of Interim Measures of
reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 743 (1973)
Protection), [1973] I.C.J. -,
[hereinafter cited as Continuance].
7. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Order Concerning the Question of the Court's
reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1077
Jurisdiction), [1972 I.C.J. -,
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction Question].
8. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Judgment on the Jurisdiction of the Court),
§§ 8, 9 [19731 I.C.J. -, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 290, 291-92
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Judgment].
9. Interim Measures, § 14.
LAW OF FISHERIES
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is rendered.' 0 Though refusing to appear before the Court, Iceland,
through correspondence, contended that the 1961 bilateral agreement was not applicable and, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction." Accordingly, Iceland argued, the Court could order neither
interim measures' 2 nor a continuance.' 3 The Court found that when
parties to an agreement have therein consented to submit to the
Court's jurisdiction, a later dispute over that agreement is within
its jurisdiction and, therefore, it is competent to entertain the
application and rule on the merits." Based on the prima facie
evidence of jurisdiction in the 1961 agreement, the Court, concluding that immediate implementation of Iceland's claim would prejudice the United Kingdom's rights, granted'5 and confirmed continuance of 6 the interim measures. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,

[1973] I.C.J.

-,

reprinted in 12

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

743

(1973).
The jurisdiction of the ICJ and its power to impose interim
measures are provided for in articles 36' 7 and 41,18 respectively, of
10. Continuance, § 1.
11. Since Iceland never pleaded against jurisdiction before the Court, the ICJ
pieced together Iceland's contentions from Iceland's correspondence directed to
the Court and the Security Council, and from public statements. Judgment, § 21. As the Court hypothesized, Iceland believed that the Agreement,
including the compromissory clause, was no longer applicable because (1) it was
agreed to under duress and therefore void ab initio; (2) it was intended to be
applicable only if Iceland attempted to extend its fisheries jurisdiction without
the required six months notice to Britain; (3) its purposes had been met; (4) it
was subject to termination after reasonable notice; and (5) the doctrine rebus sic
stantibus applied. Judgment, §§ 24-42.
12. Interim Measures, § § 5, 6.
13. Continuance, § 3.
14. Judgment, §§ 44-46.
15. Interim Measures, §§ 12-26.
16. Continuance, § 8.
17. Article 36 provides: "1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter
of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties
to the present statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to above may
be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or
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the Statute of the Court." Jurisdiction may be asserted only when
it is conferred by voluntary consent, 20 special agreement, or treaties
or conventions, 2' when it is compulsory either unconditionally or
on the condition of reciprocity,2 2 or when it is necessary to settle a
dispute over jurisdiction. 23 Because of its limited jurisdiction, 24 the
Court has refused to hear eight cases in which the Application
2
indicated a party had not consented to the Court's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in eighteen cases in which preliminary objections to
jurisdiction have been filed the Court has found jurisdiction only
eight times. 2 When an Applicant has claimed that a previous
certain states, or for a certain time. 4. Such declarations shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof
to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 5. Declarations
made under article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the
present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms. 6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." I.C.J. STAT.
art. 36.
18. Article 41 provides: "1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought
to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 2. Pending the final
decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties
and to the Security Council." I.C.J. STAT. art. 41.
19. While recognizing that ICJ opinions are not based on precedent (I.C.J.
STAT. art. 59), this discussion proceeds from an interpretation of the statutes to
an analysis of past cases on the hypothesis that such an institution as the ICJ
with a stable administration is cognizant of and usually influenced by past decisions, as indicated in article 38. See note 4 supra.
20. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 1. "The Court itself, acting propio motu, must
be satisfied that any State which is brought before it by virtue of such a Declaration has consented to the jurisdiction." Individual Opinion of President McNair,
Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Case (Preliminary Objection), [1952] I.C.J. 93, 116.
21. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, paras. 1, 2. See note 17 supra.
22. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 3.
23. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 6.
24. In 1971 only 47 of more than 127 eligible states had made declarations
under the compulsory jurisdiction clause, article 36, paragraph 2. Nine of the 47
are based on declarations made to the Permanent Court of International Justice
in accordance with art. 36, para. 5, and since 1951 six states have either terminated their declarations or allowed them to expire. [1970-1971] I.C.J.Y.B. 43, 44
& n.1.
25. Id. at 32 n.2.
26. Id. at 97 n.3.
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agreement established jurisdiction, the Court has required evidence only that the agreement was founded in international law,
and if the validity of the agreement is disputed, that the parties
voluntarily signed the agreement. 7 Unlike the jurisdiction issue
presented in every application, interim measures have been requested only three times-in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case,2" the
Interhandel Case2 and the Nuclear Test Case.30 In sanctioning
such measures, the Court, without reaching a final determination
on the question of jurisdiction, has based its order on the broad
grounds that the applicant's claim did not fall "completely outside
the scope of international jurisdiction." '3' The determination
whether a party's rights would be irreversibly injured without interim measures has been made based on the parties' rights at the
time of the request, and if granted in no way prejudges the jurisdictional question. 32 The Court has ruled only three times in the absence of a party-in the Corfu Channel Case,33 the Nottebohm
Case34 and the Nuclear Test Case.3 5 Although enforcement of a
Court order or judgment is available through the Security Council
under article 94 of the United Nations Charter,36 no overt action
27.

"These general rules ... are based on the principle that the jurisdiction

of the Court to deal with and decide a case on the merits depends on the will of
the Parties. Unless the Parties have conferred jurisdiction on the Court in accordance with Article 36, the Court lacks such jurisdiction." Anglo-Iranian Oil Case
(Preliminary Objection), [1952] I.C.J. 93, 103.
28. [1951] I.C.J. 89 (Court granted measures against the Iranian take-over
of a British oil company).
29. [1957] I.C.J. 104 (Court refused to grant measures on the ground that the
situation in the United States did not require the provisional measures envisaged
by Switzerland).
30. [1973] I.C.J.
, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 749 (1973)
(Court granted measures against France's detonating a nuclear explosion that
would shower Australian territory with radioactive fallout).
31. Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, [1951] I.C.J. 89, 93.
32. [19511 I.C.J. at 93.
33. [1949] I.C.J. 244 (Albania refused to appoint an agent to the Court,
which was assessing damages to the British ships).
34. [1953] I.C.J. 110 (Guatemala originally refused to appear before the
Court to defend its wartime nationalization of property of a Liechtenstein citizen).
35. [1973] I.C.J. -, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 749 (1973)
(France refused to appoint an agent to the Court for the hearings on Australia's
request for interim measures of protection).
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
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was taken in two previous cases when parties did not follow an
37
order of the Court.
In the instant case, there have been three major rulings: the
Order Concerning the Request for Interim Measures of Protection,3 the Judgment on the Jurisdiction of the Court,3 9 and the
Order Concerning the Continuance of Interim Measures of Protection.4 0 When considering the request for interim measures, the
Court stated that Iceland's nonappearance was not an obstacle to
the assumption of jurisdiction since Iceland had been given the
opportunity to be heard." Because of the prima facie evidence of
jurisdiction in the 1961 bilateral agreement, the Court first noted
it could institute the interim measures without prejudging its jurisdiction on the merits.42 The Court next found that implementation
of Iceland's claim would prejudice England's fishing rights, but
that to determine the extent of the British rights quantitative evaluations of the rights should be based on statistical information
from the past five years rather than ten years as argued by the
United Kingdom.13 The Court then granted interim measures, reviewable within a year at the request of either party to determine
if a continuation, modification or revocation was in order.4 In the
37. The two previous cases were the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 244
(Albania refused to pay damages awarded to the British), and the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. Case, [1951] I.C.J. 89 (Iran expropriated oil company against Court's
order of interim measures). A similar defiance of an interim measures order occurred in the Nuclear Test Case, [1973] I.C.J. -, reprintedin 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERWALS 749 (1973) (France carried out the nuclear test against the order of the
Court).
38. Interim Measures, supra note 5.
39. Judgment, supra note 8.
40. Continuance, supra note 6.
41. Interim Measures, § 17.
42. Interim Measures, § 20.
43. Interim Measures, §§ 22, 26.
44. The interim measures may be summarized as follows: (1) neither party
should aggravate the dispute; (2) the parties should not prejudice the rights of
either party whatever the decision on the merits; (3) Iceland should not take
measures to enforce her claim against British vessels fishing in the disputed
waters; (4) Iceland should not apply administrative, judicial or other measures
against British ships because of such fishing activities; (5) the United Kingdom
should insure a maximum catch of 170,000 metric tons from the disputed waters;
and (6) the United Kingdom must give Iceland and the Court all relevant information, orders issued and arrangements made concerning the control and regulation of fish catches in the area. Interim Measures, § 26.
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second major ruling, the Judgment on Jurisdiction,45 the Court,
after reviewing the history of the proceedings," summarizing the
British arguments47 and piecing together Iceland's contentions,"
justified its continuance of the case despite Iceland's nonappearance, because of its obligation under article 53 to examine propio
motu the jurisdiction question.49 Having narrowed the issue to
whether the dispute was within the compromissory clause on the
1961 bilateral agreement, and having stated that on the face of the
Application the dispute fell precisely within the terms of the
clause, the Court concluded that under the circumstances a review
of the negotiations leading to the bilateral agreement was necessary 0 Through an analysis of letters and information exchanged
by the two governments, the Court determined that this history
reinforced the United Kingdom's right to file its Application and
the validity of the Court's jurisdiction." Having refuted other possible Icelandic objections, '2 the Court concluded that its jurisdiction could be based on either the bilateral agreement or articles 36
and 53, and, accordingly, assumed jurisdiction.53 In the third major
ruling, the Continuation of the Interim Measures, the Court reviewed the Applicant's request and Iceland's observations,5 took
notice of the resumption of negotiations between the states, 5 and
reaffirmed its concern to preserve the rights of the parties. Based
on this review, the Court confirmed the continuation of the interim
measures.5 7
45. After indicating the interim measures, the Court ordered that the first
pleadings be addressed to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute. Jurisdiction Question, supra note 7.
46. Judgment, §§ 5-7.
47. Judgment, §§ 8, 9.
48. Judgment, §§ 24-29.
49. Article 53 provides: "1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before
the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to
decide in favor of its claim. 2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not
only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that
the claim is well founded in fact and law." I.C.J. STAT. ar. 53.
50. Judgment, §§ 11-17.
51. Judgment, 18-23.
52. See note 11 supra.
53. Judgment, §§ 44-46.
54. Continuance, §H 1-3.
55. Continuance, §§ 4-7.
56. Continuance, § 8.
57. Continuance, § 8 (by an 11 to 3 vote).
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The instant case indicates a willingness of the Court to pursue
controversial cases to a greater extent than earlier Courts.18 Possible reasons for this increased persistence are that the Court has
been affected by the contemporary situation or, conversely, that it
has become more secure in its judicial role. More than with most
courts, the political situation of ICJ cases must be evaluated because of the Court's consensual jurisdiction and its use of world
opinion to enforce its decisions. The Court undoubtedly has been
aware of its diminishing international role,59 increasing criticism of
its prolonged procedures,"0 and of the preparations for the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference." In 1972, the Court reacted
to criticism of its procedures by amending several of its rules.12 By
granting the interim measures on merely prima facie evidence of
jurisdiction, and subsequently finding jurisdiction, the Court may
be attempting to assert itself into a more prominent international
role; however, thus far, its recent attempts have not been successful.63 In fact, the Court may have inadvertently further diminished
its influence because Iceland probably will gain more fisheries jurisdiction through the Law of the Sea Conference than by submit58. This conclusion is supported by the persistence of the same Court in the
Nuclear Test Case. See note 30 supra.
59. See Brown, The 1971 LC.J. Advisory Opinion on South West Africa
(NAMIBIA), 5 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 213 (1971); Vallat, Fawcett, & Gross, The
Functionof the InternationalCourt of Justice in the World Community, 2 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 55, 59, 65 (Supp. 2 1972); N.Y. Times, June 7, 1973, at 44, col.
3.
60. Gross, Review of the Role of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 479 (1972).
61. The United Nations General Assembly agreed to hold the Conference two
years before the disputed Althing Resolution of 1972. G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N.

GAOR Supp. 28, reprinted in 10

INT'L LErAL MATERIALS

226 (1971).

62. Amendments to some of the rules were accepted in 1972; however, since
they are not retroactive they had no effect on this case. They are intended to
decrease the time between the filing of an application and the decision of the
Court. Jim6nes de Ar6chaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedureof the
International Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
63. Although the United Kingdom and Iceland have sporadically attempted
to negotiate a settlement, Iceland has continued to refuse to appear before the
Court or to obey the interim measures. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1973, at 5, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, May 20, 1973, at 13, col. 5; N.Y. Times, May 30, 1973, at 9, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, June 7, 1973, at 44, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973, at 38, col. 1;
The Sunday Times (London), Sept. 30, 1973, at 9, col. 4.
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ting to the Court's jurisdiction. 4 The United Kingdom, having
realized a decision of the Court would be a short-lived victory,
seems to be attempting to reach an agreement with Iceland. 6 The
Court itself may have concluded that any decision it makes would
be superseded by the results of the forthcoming Conference."6 Some
of the proposals to be considered by the Conference may support
the second hypothesis for the increased persistence-the Court's
increased self-confidence. The United States and other members
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the
Ocean Floor have proposed another international court to supervise the terms of the contemplated treaty. 7 These proposals may
indicate that the member states of the United Nations are increasingly willing to submit disputes to international arbitration and
the Court's role would be strengthened by such a development.
Significantly, because of these motivating forces, the Court appears to be attempting to correct some of its shortcomings and to
become a more viable force in the United Nations community.
Such a change would be a welcomed indication of a more rational
world order.
Edward N. Perry

64. Iceland, through the Court, could obtain up to a 50-mile limit, while
through the Conference it might obtain as much as 200 miles. The Times (London), Oct. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 7.
65. The ships of the British Navy withdrew from the disputed area in October
1973, relieving some of the international tension and concern over the situation.
The Times (London), Oct. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 7.
66. There is a Committee established to draft a treaty regarding fisheries
jurisdiction at the Conference. See G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28,

reprintedin 10 INT'L LEGAL

MATERIALS

226 (1971).

67. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Report of Sub-Committee I, Annex
III, U.N. Doc A/AC.138/94/Add.1 (1973); Statement by Ambassador Stevenson,
Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
Press Release by U.S. Information Service, Geneva, Switz. (Aug. 22, 1973).
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JURISDICTION-NATO-NORTH

ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZAAN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR
NOT
AGREEMENT
FORCES
TION STATUS OF
MEMBER OF UNITED STATES FORCE OR CIVILIAN COMPONENT

Plaintiff, a British national and civilian employee of the United
States Army, was injured while serving on an Army vessel' in the
territorial waters of the Netherlands. Pursuant to article VII(5) of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agree3
ment (NATO/SOFA), 2 plaintiff filed a claim with the Dutch Min-

istry of Defense4 as a "third party' 5 claimant. The Dutch Ministry
1. The vessel was in transit from West Germany to England. It was stipulated
that the plaintiff was injured in the performance of his duties and that the voyage

was in fulfillment of United States obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
2. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 2846
(effective Aug. 23, 1953) [hereinafter cited as NATO/SOFA]. NATO/SOFA addresses the peacetime situation in which troops from one NATO country would
be stationed in or passing through another NATO country. The treaty covers such
areas as passport and visa regulations, immigration inspections, the carrying of
arms, criminal and civil jurisdiction, the settlement of claims, local procurement
and local civilian labor requirements, and customs and foreign exchange regulations. The twelve original signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Article VIII deals with claims arising out of the
acts of members of a foreign force or civilian component in the host country where
the foreign force or civilian component is either stationed or in transit. The article
provides that all claims shall be filed, considered, and settled or adjudicated in
compliance with the laws and regulations of the host country. Claims are handled
in the same manner as those filed in the host country against members of the
armed forces of the host country. To prevent the awarding of excessive damages,
the host country must pay 25% of the settlement. Paragraph 5 of the article states
that these provisions shall apply to "[c]laims. . .arising out of acts or omissions
of members of a force or civilian component done in the performance of official
duty, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which a force or civilian
component is responsible, and causing damage in the territory of the receiving
host State to third parties, other than any of the Contracting Parties ....
NATO/SOFA, art. VIII(5) (emphasis added).
3. Plaintiff initially filed an administrative claim with the Department of
Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.
(1970). The Department ruled that his remedy lay under NATO/SOFA.
4. The Ministerie van Defensie, Dirictie Juridische Zaken, The Hague (the
Ministry of Defense) was the agency designated by Dutch authorities to hear and
settle claims. NATO/SOFA, art. VIII(5)(a).
5. This term is in article VIII(5), but is not defined by NATO/SOFA.
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rejected plaintiff's claim on the ground that plaintiff was a mem-

ber of a "civilian component"' attached to the United States
"force ' 7 in the Netherlands and therefore was not a "third party"
under article VIII(5) of NATO/SOFA. Plaintiff then sought recovery against the United States in United States district court under
the Public Vessels Act 8 and the Suits in Admiralty Act.' Defendant
United States moved for summary judgment, contending that
plaintiff's exclusive remedy10 was under article VIII(5) of
NATO/SOFA and that plaintiff's proper course of action was an
appeal of the Ministry's decision in the Dutch courts." Defendant
further contended that a Department of Defense directive,2 that

6. Article I(1)(b) of NATO/SOFA reads: "'Civilian component' means the
civilian personnel accompanying a force of a Contracting Party who are in the
employ of an armed service of that Contracting Party, and who are not stateless
persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic
Treaty ....

."

NATO/SOFA, art. I(1)(b). Because plaintiff was a national of a

contracting party (the United Kingdom), he qualified as a member of a "civilian
component" for purposes of this definition.
7.

"'[F]orce'

means the personnel belong to the .

.

. armed services of one

Contracting Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party in the North
Atlantic Treaty area in connection with their official duties
NATO/SOFA, art. I(a).
8. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741 et seq. (1970).
9. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq. (1970).
10. Brief for Defendant at 15, Newington v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1012
(E.D. Va. 1973). For the proposition that NATO/SOFA, when applied to the
Newington facts, provided an exclusive remedy, defendant cited Shafter v.
United States, 273 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 400 F.2d 584
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969). In Shafter, relatives of German
citizens killed in a collision between their fishing boat and a United States naval
vessel sought to bring an action under the Public Vessel Act. A United States
district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that
article VIII of NATO/SOFA applied to the facts presented and excluded concurrent and inconsistent jurisdiction invoked by plaintiffs under the Public Vessels
Act.
11. Defendant argued that the Netherlands should consider plaintiff as one
who had been injured by a member of the Dutch armed forces. Defendant noted
that article 1403(3) of the Dutch Civil Code provides for suits against the Kingdom of the Netherlands in such cases. Brief for Defendant at 22.
12. The directive was from the Deputy General Counsel for the Defense Department and addressed to the claims division of the Air Force. The directive
states that it is "legally permissible and in fact desirable . . . to permit and

encourage the claims authorities of the foreign countries involved to process and
pay the claims of. . . personnel under the provisions of Article VIII of NATO/
SOFA if such personnel pursue such remedy." The directive notes that the Army
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classified members of a force or civilian component as proper third

party claimants was an executive interpretation' 3 of NATO/SOFA
that should be accepted by the district court. 4 Plaintiff, relying on
the negotiative history of NATO/SOFA, argued that the framers
did not intend that a member of a force or civilian component be
considered a third party claimant under article VIII(5) and, therefore, article VIII(5) was not his exclusive reinedy. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, held,
defendant's motion for summary judgment denied. When a member of a United States force or civilian component, who is injured
in a NATO country, is not recognized by that NATO country as a
proper third party claimant under article VIII(5) of NATO/SOFA,
the injured party is not compelled to regard NATO/SOFA as his
exclusive remedy. Newington v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1012

(E.D. Va. 1973).
With the onset of the Cold War, the NATO countries realized
had not allowed such claims in the past because of the objections of Canada and
the United Kingdom. To meet their requests the directive provides that the
policy of considering United States military personnel and employees of the
military as "third parties" when damaged in the host country should be applied
only when the other NATO partner wishes its troops to be accorded like treatment when in the United States. The Department of Defense directive, dated
February 26, 1959, was furnished by Emmet B. Lewis, attorney for defendant.
13. As a general proposition, United States courts give "great weight" to
executive interpretations of treaties. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295

(1933). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE UNITED

152 (1965).
14. Since NATO/SOFA is a multilateral treaty, the manner in which other
signatories have dealt with article VIII(5) should be considered; unfortunately,
there are few reported cases and pertinent statistics. Defendant cited Browning
v. The War Office and Another, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750 (C.A.), in which a United
States serviceman, who was stationed in England and injured while a passenger
in a vehicle negligently driven by a British serviceman, was allowed to recover in
a suit against the British War Office. Defendant alleged that the United States
serviceman's status as a "third party" claimant was challenged unsuccessfully in
the unreported proceeding of the trial court. The cited Court of Appeals decision
dealt only with the question of damages. Brief for Defendant at 12, 13.
Defendant submitted the pleadings and judgment of an unreported Canadian
case, Bradley v. The Queen, No. 112199 in the Exchequer Court of Canada,
decided May 15, 1957. In Bradley, plaintiff, a Canadian national and civilian
employee of the United States Air Force in Canada, was injured through the
negligent driving of a United States serviceman. Plaintiff recovered in a suit
against the Canadian Government. No mention of NATO/SOFA was made in
either the pleadings or the judgment.
STATES §
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that the multilateral nature of their defense commitments would
require the stationing of troops of one NATO country in the territory of another. NATO/SOFA represents an attempt by these nations to establish the rights and duties of these troops while they
are stationed in or passing through the territory of a NATO partner. Article VII of the agreement was designed to settle by administrative action of the host government claims that arise as a result
of the activities of the foreign force or its civilian component in the
host country. One potential claimant under article VIII is the
"third party." The agreement excludes a NATO government from
the definition of "third party" but otherwise does not define the
term. The negotiative history' 5 of NATO/SOFA reveals that the
negotiators viewed the third party as a citizen of the host country
who was wronged by a member of a visting NATO force.' 6 During
the negotiations, the United States representative to the Working
Group expressed the fear that an arbitrator settling claims under
article VIII would be too partial to his compatriots," thus expressing the assumption that recurred throughout the negotiating and
legislative history of the agreement that the person hearing the
claim and the person bringing the claim would be citizens of the
same state.'8 In describing new obligations incurred by the United
States under NATO/SOFA, the State Department noted that the
NATO/SOFA claims procedure enables local citizens claiming injury by NATO armed forces to pursue their claim through their
15. See U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1961 (J. Snee
ed. 1966).
16. The minutes of the Working Group meeting of June 5, 1951, state that the
Italian Representative stated that prompt payment under article VIJI(5) was
essential "to maintaining good relations between the force and the local population." Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 152.
18. Hearings on Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed
Forces, and Military Headquarters Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];
Supplementary Hearingon Status of Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Before
the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). One witness,
in citing an example when article VIII(5) would be applicable, envisioned a
visiting division overrunning a farmer's crops. Statement of Walter Bedell Smith,
Under Secretary, Department of State, Senate Hearings, at 6. Another witness
gave an example of an American jeep colliding with a privately owned French
vehicle. Statement of Robert Haydock, Counsel for Foreign and Military Affairs,
Department of Defense, Senate Hearings,at 18.
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own government's administrative agency. 9 While an injured member of the same force or civilian component was not envisioned as
a proper third party, however, he was not barred from asserting
third party status in a claim for damages. Thus the Department
of Defense in interpreting and actually administering the terms of
article VIII(5) encouraged third party claims to be filed by United
States servicemen and civilian defense employees in those NATO
countries that wished reciprocal treatment in the United States for
their troops.20 An important policy decision affecting selection of
the proper jurisdiction in which to bring a damage claim was inherent, though unstated, in the 1959 directive. 21 United States servicemen and civilian defense employees were directed to file their
claims at "the place of the wrong" regardless whether there were
sufficient "significant contacts" or "governmental interest" in the
foreign state in which the tortious act occurred to justify the foreign state's assuming jurisdiction.22 The policy announced in the

19. The State Department reply noted: "We are obliged to recognize the new
procedure for settlement of possible claims under which the local citizen has a
right to claim through his government and receive settlement from it ...

"

Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 28, 29 (emphasis added).
20. One commentator, a former Legal Adviser to the Allied Forces, Central
Europe, noting that article VIII(5) is "quite comprehensive as to the [sic] persons," opined that "the absence of any restriction in NATO/SOFA even allows a
member of a Force or of a civilian component having suffered damages through
acts or omissions of another member of a Force or of a civilian component while
they were both on duty to claim on the basis of article VIII, paragraph 5 to the
extent to which his personal damages have not already been compensated for.
This interpretation .

.

. seems to us to derive from the general trend of the

Agreement." S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 305, 306 (1971).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. The traditional rule in state courts of the United States is that the law of
the place of the wrong governs the substantive rights of parties involved in tort
litigation. This rule-lex loci delicti-is based on the "vested rights doctrine,"
which holds that rights and liabilities of a party vest at the time of the tort and
there remain until effected by the court in whatever jurisdiction the action happens to be brought. See 3 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73, at 1967-69 (1935).
This was the position taken by the original Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934). Under the lex loci rule, the judicial task was
simple and predictable; the court merely identified the place of the wrong and
applied the law of that jurisdiction. Persistent scholarly criticism noted that the
rigidity of the rule did not permit courts to assess the policy considerations of a
forum whose contacts with the parties and issues might far outweight those of the
Vol. 7-No. 2
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directive, however, was not followed in dealings with the Federal
Republic of Germany when the Supplementary Agreement 23 was
negotiated.? The Supplementary Agreement incorporated by reference' the claims provisions of article VIII but added that the
article would not apply to damage suffered by members of a force
or civilian component injured by members of that same force or
26
civilian component.
place of the wrong. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAW § 90, at 206
(rev. ed. 1968); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role
and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1945). Beginning in the early sixties, some state
courts, seeking to avoid what they considered to be harsh results, looked to the
law of the place having dominant contacts or most significant contacts with the
issues in litigation. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Griffith v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The Restatement (Second),
in a significant change of emphasis, urges the application of the "law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 145 (1971). The Restatement then cites cases in over twenty jurisdictions
that have adhered to this general principle. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS, Citations to § 145, app. at 592-603 (1971). Thus, the trend away from
a mechanistic application of the lex loci rule is unmistakable. The same trend is
observable in the federal courts, which are required to use the conflict law as well
as the local law rule of the states in which they are sitting in diversity cases.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
23. Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement with
Respect to Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, July 1, 1963,
[1963] 11 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351 (effective July 1, 1963) [hereinafter cited
as Supplementary-Agreement].
24. The Federal Republic of Germany became a Party to the North Atlantic
Treaty on October 23, 1954, the same day that the Occupying Forces ended the
occupational regime in Germany. NATO partners felt that simple accession to
NATO/SOFA by the Federal Republic would not provide adequate rights and
immunities for their troops in Germany. Thus, supplemental agreements were
concluded between the Federal Republic and Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States and signed in Bonn on
August 3, 1959. Ratification was not accomplished until July 1, 1963. For a more
complete history of the Federal Republic's accession to NATO/SOFA see S. LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 430-32.
25. Supplementary Agreement, art. 41(1).
26. Article 41(6) of the Supplementary Agreement states: "[Tihis Article
shall not apply to damage suffered by members of a force or of a civilian component and caused by acts or omissions of other members of the same force or the
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The court in the instant case viewed the Department of Defense
directive 27 concerning the third party status of a member of a force
or civilian component for article VIIJ(5) purposes as requiring reciprocity of treatment between the United States and the other
NATO countries. The court stated that the refusal 8 of the Dutch
Ministry of Defense to recognize plaintiff's third party status, in
the absence of a mutual agreement to the contrary between the
United States and the Netherlands, precluded plaintiffs bringing
an action under the article. The court also noted that the language
of the Department of Defense directive 9 was permissive rather
than mandatory, making third party status available to members
of a force or civilian component when reciprocity is present but not
compelling its use as an exclusive remedy, and expressed its agreement with the policy of limiting the term "third party" to local
citizens of the host country, quoting supporting passages ° from
both the negotiating and legislative histories of NATO/SOFA. This
policy, the court reasoned, is consistent with the choice-of-law
principle of significant contacts.3 1 The court stated that even following the terms of the Department of Defense directive32 plaintiff
same civilian component.

.

. ."

Thus, had the instant case arisen in West Ger-

many, the Supplementary Agreement clearly would have barred plaintiff's asserting third party status.
27. See note 12 supra.
28. 354 F. Supp. at 1015. The court did not discuss defendant's contention
that plaintiff should be made to appeal the decision of the Dutch Ministry of
Defense in the Dutch courts. See note 12 supra.
29. See note 12 supra.
30. 354 F. Supp. at 1015. See note 16 supra.
31. 354 F. Supp. at 1015. The court cited Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,
582 (1953). In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman, who was temporarily in New York and
knew that the rights of crew members would be governed by Danish law, signed
on a ship of Danish flag and registry and owned by a Danish citizen. The seaman
was injured while the ship was in Havana. The court found that Danish law was
favored by an overwhelming preponderance of the connecting factors and that
plaintiff should not be allowed to bring an action under the Jones Act. It can be
argued that a slight shift in the Newington facts-the involvement of Dutch
citizens or property-dictates that a Dutch civil court is the more appropriate
forum from the standpoint of significant contacts. Thus, application of a significant contacts standard will not guarantee automatic selection of either the host
country or the visting country as the proper forum. The way is still left open for
ad hoc determinations. The instant court, presented with an injury that occurred
on a ship in transit through Dutch waters, dealt with a simplified fact situation
and did not find it necessary to approach this difficult problem.
32. The court viewed the Department of Defense directive as making third
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could not be accorded third party status and, therefore, need not
consider NATO/SOFA his exclusive remedy.
The instant case reveals the need for clarification of the phrase
"third party" in the NATO/SOFA treaty. The failure to define this
phrase may be the result of an assumption, present in both the
negotiating and the legislative history, that the third party would
be a local citizen of the host country. In narrowly interpreting the
term "third party," the Newington court was able to reach a result
that is in accord with the court's stated" preference for a policy
that would confer third party status only on local citizens under
the choice-of-law principle of significant contacts. It can be argued
that although the third party claim procedure primarily envisioned
local citizens, it is not limited to them. It is difficult to argue,
however, that such a notable group as injured members of the same
force or civilian component would have gone unmentioned if the
framers had contemplated their protection under this article. The
Department of Defense directive, 34 instead of specifically addressing this omission, took an ad hoc approach and affirmed different
policies for different NATO countries, depending on a finding of
reciprocity. Thus, it is only in pursuing a claim that a claimant
may discover whether reciprocity exists and thereby determine
which policy is in effect. The Newington court, in much the same
way as the directive, proposed an ad hoc solution based on a finding of reciprocity or lack thereof but, again like the directive, did
not forumlate standards on which to base that finding. Newington
still leaves the future claimant without standards to which he can
refer in advance of administrative or judicial proceedings and compels the claimant and his attorney to act on the basis of an informed guess. Because of the facts in this case, this court did not
have to decide under what circumstances, if any, NATO/SOFA
should be regarded as providing an exclusive remedy. If the purpose of article VIII(5) is merely to provide a more convenient
method of settling claims, rather than the only acceptable method
of doing so, there may not be a need or a desire to make its remedy
party status available only when reciprocity of treatment was intended. The court
felt that plaintiff's treatment by Dutch authorities demonstrated a lack of reciprocity and, thus, made third party status unavailable to plaintiff. 354 F. Supp.
at 1015.
33. 354 F. Supp. at 1015.
34. See note 12 supra.
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exclusive..3 1 The effect of the Newington ruling is limited further by
the multilateral character of NATO, which necessarily discourages
according great weight to the decisions of the courts of one nation.
The solution for this state of affairs lies with the NATO
governments that failed to adequately define "third party." The
NATO countries must decide whether their respective courts and
administrative agencies are the proper forum for settlement of
claims by members of the same visting force or civilian component.
This determination may depend on the standard the NATO nations believe is proper for assumption of jurisdiction over damage
claims. Adherence to choice-of-law principles of significant contacts or governmental interest often would lead to a view that
foreign courts or administrative agencies are not the proper forum
for settlement of such claims and should not assume jurisdiction
over them. On the other hand, jurisdiction based on the clear,
albeit somewhat arbitrary, standard of "place of the wrong" would
allow settlement of such claims and assure relative certainty of the
proper forum for relief. The place of the wrong standard would still
permit prompt, efficient settlement of claims filed by local citizens. Nations may not wish, however, to assume jurisdiction over
claims that fortuitously occur in their territory but otherwise have
no connection with their nationals. Once the NATO nations agree
on a proper basis for assumption of jurisdiction over damage
claims, the term "third party" can be redefined specifically to
include or exclude settlement of claims filed by members of the
same visting force or civilian component pursuant to article
VIII(5). Only after clarifying the term "third party" should the
NATO nations consider the desirability of making such a remedy
exclusive.
Edward A. Betancourt

35. If the remedy provided is to be made exclusive it must also be made
unambiguous, not only for the manner in which relief is sought but also for those
persons who should properly regard it as their remedy. A court will be reluctant
to infer that a remedy is exclusive when to do so would leave without remedy one
who is the apparent victim of imprecise drafting.
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